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DO WE BELIEVE IN GENEROSITY?:
REFLECTIONS ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
GIFTS AND EXCHANGES
Jane B. Baron*
What are gifts? Do they derive from a 'detached and disinterested
generosity'? I Are they means toward establishing "a feeling-bond between two people,"2 or, more generally, of constructing "a wide range
of possible social worlds as stable arenas for social interaction"?3 Are
they fundamentally "sentimental arrangements," 4 "one-sided proposi6
tion[s] '' s of "relatively trivial" economic significance?

Or perhaps gifts only seem to have these qualities.7 Rather than
proceeding from generosity, it is possible that gifts are obligatory and

*Professor of Law, Temple University School of Law. A.B., 1975, Radcliffe College; J.D.,
1978, Harvard Law School. I thank Carol Rose and the editors of the FloridaLaw Review for
inviting me to comment on the text of Professor Rose's Dunwody Lecture.
1. Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 285 (1960) (quoting Commissioner v. LoBue,
351 U.S. 243, 246 (1955)). Defining gifts has proved troublesome in the tax context. The courts
must define gifts because property acquired by "gift" is excluded from income under section
102 of the Internal Revenue Code. I.R.C. § 102 (1988). In addition, "a contribution or gift" for
certain charitable purposes is deductible under section 170 of the Internal Revenue Code. I.R.C.
§ 170 (1988). For a recent attempt to define "gift" in connection with the latter provision, see
Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680 (1989).
2. LEWIS HYDE, THE GIFT: IMAGINATION AND THE EROTIC LIFE OF PROPERTY 56
(1979); see also Patrick Geary, Sacred Commodities: The Circulation of Medieval Relics, in
THE SOCIAL LIFE OF THINGS: COMMODITIES IN CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE 169, 173 (Arjun
Appadurai ed., 1986) (arguing that the goal of certain medieval gift-giving was "the establishment
of bonds between giver and receiver").
3. DAVID CHEAL, THE GIFT ECONOMY 136 (1988); see also Alvin W. Gouldner, The Norm
of Reciprocity: A Preliminary Statement, 25 Am. Soc. REV. 161, 174 (1960) ("the norm of
reciprocity is a concrete and special mechanism involved in the maintenance of any stable social
system").
4. S.J. Stoljar, A Rationale of Gifts and Favours, 19 MOD. L. REV. 237,237 n.1 (1956).
5. Henry W. Ballentine, Mutuality and Consideration,28 HARV. L. REV. 121, 131 (1914).
6. Melvin A. Eisenberg, Donative Promises, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 4 (1979). Lon Fuller
maintained that "a gift is... a 'sterile transmission."' Lon L. Fuller, Considerationand Form,
41 COLUm. L. REV. 799, 815 (1941) (quoting CLAUDE BUFNOIR, PROPRIETE ET CONTRAT
487 (2d ed. 1924)).
7. For more detailed development of these questions, see Jane B. Baron, Gifts, Bargains,
and Form, 64 IND. L.J. 155 (1988-1989).
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interested." The feelings they reflect or construct may be less those
of trust and connection than of domination and control. 9 Instead of
being economically insignificant, gifts and the process by which they
are exchanged may constitute a unique and important economy of
non-material as well as material goods. 10
What are exchanges? Are they impersonal, precisely calculated
transactions designed to satisfy the preferences of self-interested rational utility maximizers?" Do exchanges empower individuals and
foster autonomy by allowing people to determine their own legal relations?12 Are they economically significant transactions "which conduce
. . . to the production of wealth and the division of labor. . . .?13
Or perhaps exchanges only seem to have these qualities. Perhaps,
as Professor Rose suggests, "the category of exchange requires the
very element of unilateral generosity that seems to make gift so
strange.'1 4 Perhaps the self-interest that purportedly drives productive
markets requires forms of trust and cooperation conventionally associated with gifts. 15 Perhaps conventional economic productivity requires a complex interaction of gift-giving and exchange-bargaining.16

8.

MARCEL MAuss, THE GIFT: FORMS AND FUNCTIONS OF EXCHANGE IN ARCHAIC

SOCIETIES 1 (Ian Cunnison trans., 1967).
9. C.A. GREGORY, GIFTS AND COMMODITIES 19 (1982). Gregory distinguished clan-based
from class-based societies in this respect. See id. at 15-24. Others have been willing to generalize
more widely. See, e.g., Barry Schwartz, The Social Psychology of the Gift, 73 AM. J. Soc. 1,
4 (1967) (arguing that, through gifts, people maintain ascendancy by regulating the indebtedness
of others to them).
10. See George C. Homans, Social Behavior as Exchange, 63 AM. J. Soc. 597, 606 (1958)
(suggesting that social behavior is an economy in which "[p]ersons that give much to others try
to get much from them, and persons that get much from others are under pressure to give
much to them").
11. See Carol M. Rose, Propertyas Storytelling: Perspectivesfrom Game Theory, Narrative
Theory, Feminist Theory, 2 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 37, 42 (1990); see also GREGORY, supra
note 9, at 19 (noting that in a class-based economy, "commodity exchange establishes a relationship between the objects exchanged, whereas gift exchange establishes a relationship between
the subjects").
12. See Fuller, supra note 6, at 809.
13. Id. at 815; see also Paul R. Hays, Formal Contracts and Consideration:A Legislative
Program,41 COLUM. L. REV. 849, 853 (1941) ("The enforcement of business exchange promises
plays an important part in the working of our economic system."); Edwin W. Patterson, An
Apology for Consideration, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 929, 946 (1958) ("Bargaining is an important
pattern of conduct in economic activities that serve our material wants . .
").
14. Carol M. Rose, Giving, Trading, Thieving, and Trusting: How and Why Gifts Become
Exchanges, and (More Importantly) Vice Versa, 44 FLA. L. REV. 295, 315 (1992).
15. See id.; see also Rose, supra note 11, at 52-53:
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As legal categories, then, "gifts" and "exchanges" seem remarkably
unstable, both at the core and on the periphery. Definitions of each
are seriously contested. Gifts may be understood either in terms of
generosity and sentiment or in terms of selfishness and domineering
power. 17 Exchanges may be understood either in terms of arm's length

self-seeking or in terms of community-based trust.' These ambiguities
within the definitions of the core concepts make it impossible to draw
clear boundaries between the two categories and render it inevitable,
as Professor Rose argues, that gifts will "leak" into exchange and vice

versa.' 9
Does it matter that gifts and exchanges cannot be sustained as
discrete categories? Why has the distinction seemed important? One
arena in which the gift/exchange dichotomy has seemed salient is that
of form: unlike exchanges, which have sometimes been seen as intrinsically self-policing, 2° gifts have traditionally been the subject of highly
formal requirements, which are said to promote deliberation in giving
and to enhance the reliability of the evidence that a gift has been
made. 2 1 Yet many of the formalities of the law of donative transfers
especially those of wills law - have come under attack in recent
-

[T]here is a gap between the kind of self-interested individual who needs exclusive
property to induce him to labor, and the kind of individual who has to be there
to create, maintain, and protect a property regime. The existence of a property
regime is not predictable from a starting point of rational self-interest....
Cooperation . . . is a preference ordering that the classical property theorists
weren't counting on in theory, but that they can't do without.
Id.
16. See Rose, supra note 14, at 315-16. "If we do not understand gift very well as a matter
of economic theory . . . then we really do not understand exchange much better, because
exchange depends at some deep level on giving. . . . [Exchange] make[s] the business world
go round." Id. at 316-17.
17. See Baron, supra note 7, at 194-98.
18. See Rose, supra note 14, at 308-13.
19. Id. at 308-09.
20. See, e.g., Karl N. Llewellyn, What Price Contract? - An Essay in Perspective, 40
YALE L.J. 704, 743 (1931) ("The existence of bargain equivalency does indeed commonly evidence
positively that the promise was deliberate
some promise was in fact made . .. ").

. .

. [and] gives . . . fair ground for believing that

21. For the traditional arguments concerning the functions of form in donative transfers,
see Ashbel G. Gulliver & Catherine J. Tilson, Classificationof GratuitousTransfers, 51 YALE
L.J. 1, 1-5 (1941); Philip Mechem, The Requirement of Delivery in Gifts of Chattels and of
Choses in Action Evidenced by Commercial Instruments, 21 U. ILL. L. REv. 341 (1926). For
a critique of the functional justification, see Baron, supra note 7.
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years, 22 and a trend to reduce formalities is discernible in the 1990
revision of Article II of the Uniform Probate Code, which both eliminates many formalities altogether and also allows courts to excuse
harmless errors in complying with those formalities that remain.While formalism and the ideology it reflects are by no means dead,they are, thankfully, not flourishing either.
Putting aside matters of form, for what other reasons have we
asked questions about the "nature" of giving and the differences between gifts and exchanges? Often it appears that we ask these questions in order to determine whether, as individuals, we are (or can
learn to be) altruists or whether we are, instead, selfish egoists.2
Consider, for example, Professor Rose's description of the "quintessential gift" as "an unforced, one-sided transfer, motivated by generosity
and a spirit of selfless love without thought of reciprocity. '26 Surely
if such gifts are given, then humans must be altruistic (or, at least,
have altruistic possibilities).Y
Motives, however, are never clear, as Professor Rose's "leakage"
examples demonstrate.- Psychologists 29 and sociologists- have made

22. See, e.g., John H. Langbein, Substantial Compliance With the Wills Act, 88 HARV.
L. REV. 489 (1975); James Lindgren, Abolishing the Attestation Requirement for Wills, 68 N.C.
L. REV. 541 (1990).
23. See UNIFORM PROBATE CODE art. II,pt. 5 (1990), especially § 2-503.
24. See Baron, supra note 7.
25. See ROBERTA G. SIMMONS ET AL., GIFT OF LIFE: THE SOCIAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL
IMPACT OF ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION 444-45 (1977) (examining the connection between giving
and altruism in the context of organ donation); RICHARD M. TITMUSS, THE GIFT RELATIONSHIP: FROM HUMAN BLOOD TO SOCIAL POLICY 88-89, 198-99 (1971) (examining why people
give blood); see also CHEAL, supra note 3, at 85-86 (describing the folk belief that gift giving
derives from an "ideology of love," according to which feelings of generosity "spring directly
from the individual's being, without social intervention").
26. Rose, supra note 14, at 302.
27. See SIMMONS ET AL., supra note 25, at 444 (suggesting that "altruistic behavior is
intrinsically rewarding for great numbers of donors").
28. Rose, supra note 14, at 302-08.
29. See, e.g., Ronald Cohen, Altrtism: Human, Cultural, or What?, in ALTRUISM, SYMPATHY, AND HELPING: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL PRINCIPLES 79, 82-83 (L. Wisp6
ed., 1978) (describing the "hedonistic paradox" whereby "even the most unselfish act may
produce a psychological reward for the actor"): Martin L. Hoffman, The Development of Empathy, in ALTRUISM AND HELPING BEHAVIOR: SOCIAL, PERSONALITY, AND DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVES 41 (J. Phillippe Rushton & Richard M. Sorrentino eds., 1981) (suggesting
that hidden, unconscious, or tacit self-regarding motives can always be seen as constituting the
"real" source of apparently other-oriented behavior).
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the same point: unconsciously, we may behave altruistically - help
others - for selfish, egoistic reasons.3 1 If the "pure gift" is never
given, then maybe we are not altruistic after all.
Or maybe we have been seeking altruism in the wrong place.
Professor Rose challenges the conventional association of exchange
with self-interestl and suggests that at least some degree of "unilateral
generosity"-- is necessary to "make the business world go round." In this view, altruism is very much alive, but it is hidden under the
deceptively coercive exterior of the state 36 and the falsely selfish appearance of the market.
There is a descriptive point to be made here: just as the category
"gift" is shot through with behaviors and consequences we conventionally associate with the category "exchange, '' 37 so the category "exchange" is shot through with "giving." To the extent that we believe
that legal distinctions can and ought to be based on real differences
in human behavior, there is something wrong with the categories;
they don't "fit" the facts.3 9 Categories that require transactions to be
one-sided or two-sided, other-directed or self-interested, generous or
selfish are not terribly helpful if human motivations are inevitably
40
complex and mixed.

30. See, e.g., PETER M. BLAU, EXCHANGE AND POWER IN SOCIAL LIFE 17 (1964) (stating
that beneath the apparent "altruism" of social life is an underlying "egoism": "the tendency to
help others is frequently motivated by the expectation that doing so will bring social rewards
31.

For a provocative challenge to this point, see Jon Elster, Selfishness and Altruism, in

BEYOND SELF-INTEREST

32.

44 (Jane J. Mansbridge ed., 1990).

Rose, supra note 14, at 316.

33. Id. at 308-14.
34. Id. at 315.
35. Id. at 317.
36. Id. at 314-15. Professor Rose's treatment of Leviathan is a bit ambiguous. Leviathan
is coercive in "forc[ing] upon us an involuntary reciprocal exchange." Id. at 314. Yet Leviathan
"rests on an initial act of giving too..... " Id. at 315. Does the initial gift of the organizational
efforts necessary, in Professor Rose's view, to create the state render Leviathan's enforcement
of contracts less coercive?
37. See Baron, supra note 7, at 194-98.
38. Rose, supra note 14, at 315.
39. See Jay M. Feinman, The Jurisprudence of Classification, 41 STAN. L. REV. 661, 679
(1989) (describing the use of factual similarities and differences in schemes of legal classification).
40. See Aijun Appadura, Introduction: Commodities and the Politics of Value, in THE
SOCIAL LIFE OF THINGS, supra note 2, at 3, 11-12 ("Gifts, and the spirit of reciprocity,
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The problem may be deeper than is conveyed in the hackneyed
notion of "mixed motives." It may derive from the law's underlying,
oversimplified, conception of the human purposes served by both gifts
and exchanges. Notwithstanding doctrines that treat gifts and exchanges as fundamentally different types of transactions ' the law
assumes that both are animated by atomistic individualism. Both, after
all, are means of disposing of property, and there is no doubting the
association between property and individual autonomy in our legal and
social theory42 Whether by making unilateral, economically sterile3
"gifts," or by entering into bilateral, wealth-enhancing "exchanges,"
individuals are seen as expressing and actualizing their "freedom";
freedom of disposition, freedom of testation, freedom of contract, free4
dom of choice.
Professor Rose is not alone in questioning this vision of autonomous
individuality based on "free" choices. Martha Minow, for example, has
suggested that "this notion of the autonomous rights-bearing individual
presupposes a community - a community willing to recognize and
enforce individual rights. . . . Autonomy, even as an aspiration, is

sociability, and spontaneity in which they are typically exchanged, usually are starkly opposed
to the profit-oriented, self-centered, and calculated spirit that fires the circulation of commodities.
. . . [T]his is a simplified and overdrawn series of contrasts."); Jane J. Mansbridge, Preface,
in BEYOND SELF-INTEREST, supra note 34, at x-xi ("Before modern social science began to
rely so exclusively on self-interest to explain human action, most major thinkers realized that
human beings had benevolent and malevolent as well as self-interested motives.").
41. For discussions of some of these differences, see Baron, supra note 7; Mary Louise
Fellows, Donative Promises Redux, in PROPERTY LAW AND LEGAL EDUCATION: ESSAYS IN
HONOR OF JOHN

E.

CRIBBET

27 (Peter Hay & Michael H. Hoeflich eds., 1988); John H.

Langbein & Lawrence W. Waggoner, Reformation of Wills on the Ground of Mistake: Change
of Direction in American Law?, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 521 (1982).
42. See, e.g., Mary Louise Fellows, In Search of Donative Intent, 73 IOWA L. REV. 611,
611 n.1 (1988) ("No one disputes the influence of individualism on the Western concept of
property."); Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577, 605
(1988) ("[I]t seems no coincidence that the doctrines of fixed promisekeeping and fixed property
entitlements developed more or less contemporaneously with a social theory that originally
envisioned a radical separateness among human beings.").
43. See supra note 6.
44. See Baron, supra note 7, at 158 n.4, 167 n.62 (examining donative transfers as the
expression of freedom); Fuller, supra note 6, at 806 (examining exchange as the expression of
freedom: "When a court enforces a promise it is merely arming with legal sanction a rule ...
previously established by the party himself."). However, the connection between choice and
freedom has been questioned. See Gregory S. Alexander, Freedom, Coercion, and the Law of
Servitudes, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 883, 884-85 (1988).
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the invention of a cultural and linguistic community." 45 No wonder,
then, that we cannot realize ourselves as "free" individuals through
self-seeking exchange except by "giving" a little, that is, by recognizing
and trusting others. 46 Conventional images of gifts and exchanges alike
seem impoverished by the internally-contradictory, unworkable assumption of a radical separation between self and other.
Rethinking the gift/exchange dichotomy, then, may require a rethinking of our idea of individualism as freedom from others. 47 It may
be perfectly accurate to say, as conventional wisdom has it, that in
giving and exchanging we express individualism. But that individualism does not have to imply separation. We give to others, and
we trade with others; neither activity can be done by any individual
alone. If these activities are expressions of autonomy, then it may be
appropriate to reconceive autonomy in terms of relationship or connection. As Jennifer Nedelsky has suggested, "people do not exist in
isolation, but in social and political relations. People develop their
predispositions, their interests, their autonomy - in short, their identity - in large part out of these relations. ' 48 Professor Rose is right
to remind us that the interconnected processes of giving and exchanging help constitute us not as isolated, selfish individuals but as a
49
culture or community.
Nonetheless, while I am heartily in favor of any project that encourages us to rethink the relationship between the individual and the
community, I am not entirely comfortable with the notion of the market

45. MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND
AMERICAN LAW 300 (1990).
46. See Rose, supra note 14, at 310. Competition for the lion's share of the positive gains
from an exchange can prevent exchange; to avoid this haggling problem, "one party or both
parties may simply be generous... " Id.
47. On the American idea of autonomy as a wall of rights isolating individuals from potentially-threatening others, see Jennifer Nedelsky, Law, Boundaries, and the Bounded Self, 30
REPRESENTATIONS, Spring 1990, at 162, 167.
48. Jennifer Nedelsky, Reconceiving Autonomy: Sources, Thoughts and Possibilities, 1
YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 7, 21 (1989); see also MINOW, supra note 45, at 302-03 (noting that
"[e]ach statement of an individual's rights implicitly or explicitly draws reference to others and
thus expresses interconnection at the very moment that the individual asserts his or her autonomy ....

[AIR rights claims imply relationships among mutually dependent members of a

community.").
49. See Rose, supra nofe 14, at 316 ('"he 'exchange gift' looks forward to a future history
of dealings, and it leads to all the branching and variety that comes with a history and ultimately

a culture.").
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as the medium for the cultivation and vindication of trust. Professor
Rose relies on relational contract and game theories to assert that
there is a good deal of flexibility and cooperation among business
dealers and that "[t]he sharp bargainer is by no means the image of
success in commerce ....-50 All this may be so, but I wonder how
many ordinary consumers would describe even their years of shopping
at the same neighborhood supermarket as a series of "successive trustful relations."' 1 Between the "twilight edges of the market," where
one-shot dealers trade with "gullible strangers," 52 and the realm of
"doux commerce," in which "trade and commerce ... soften manners
and make those engaged in commerce more attentive to the needs of
others,"- lies a large grey area.
As Professor Rose has noted elsewhere, the rhetoric we use about
ourselves and our institutions can matter a great deal.M I understand
her now to assert that insofar as the "powerfully self-interested
rhetoric of contract law" assumes "a world of individuals whose dealings with each other are based on entitlement and self-interest rather
than fellow-feeling, ' 56 it is both incomplete and inaccurate because it
leaves out the "systematic" element of gift that lies "at the center of
quite normal kinds of exchanges."-5 Yet I am concerned that we not
substitute for the old rhetoric simply a new, equally-misleading rhetoric
which suggests that, in fact, we have little to fear from the market.
Just as over-differentiating gifts from bargains can devalue "giving'
' so, I fear, emphasizing the percompared to "commodity exchange,' as
vasiveness of trust in trade can legitimate market processes that, to
many, are experienced as neither kindly nor amicable.5 9

50. Id. at 310.
51. Id. at 316.
52. Id. at 310.
53. Id. at 313.
54. See Rose, supra note 42, at 610 ("[A]s rhetoric," crystalline, formal rules and muddy,
flexible standards "suggest quite different ways that each self-contained individual should behave
and converse with all those other self-contained individuals.").
55. Rose, supra note 14, at 311.
56. Rose, supra note 42, at 605.
57. Rose, supra note 14, at 311; see id. at 315-16.
58. See Baron, supra note 7, at 189, 200-01.
59. For a discussion of the way ideas can function "hegemonically" to legitimate the status
quo by encouraging the view that things are already about as good as they can be, see Robert
W. Gordon, New Developments in Legal Theory, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE
CRITIQUE 413, 418 (David Kairys, rev. ed. 1990).
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It is not, after all, as if the market as an institution needs much
help or defense. Especially in comparison to gifts, market exchanges
tend to be depicted and understood as inherently natural, necessary
and good.6 Given the relatively high regard in which market bargains
have traditionally been held, one wonders whether exchange as a
concept is really in need of the moral boost it receives from the discovery that it is implicitly generous.
The legal literature discussing both the consideration doctrine and
the formalities required for donative transfers tends to dichotomize
and distinguish gifts and exchanges.61 Gifts have never fared well in
the comparisons. Generosity has been viewed as both uncommon and
suspicious.6

Professor Rose's analysis of the ubiquity of generosity in exchange
-

or at least at the start of exchange -

is, I think, a welcome

antidote to the skepticism with which gifts have been treated. Yet I
fear that the cure has the potential to perpetuate the disease. As a
value worthy of respect in its own right, generosity can be just as
diminished or marginalized by being incorporated into exchange as it
can by being too thoroughly distinguished from exchange. Professor
Rose leaves me wondering: Do we really believe in generosity at all?

60. See Baron, supra note 7, at 182-86. For a detailed account of qualities conventionally
attributed to the market, see Frances E. Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of
Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARv. L. REv. 1497 (1983).
61. See Baron, supra note 7, at 179-88.
62. Id. at 188-89.
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